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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1084

E.O. 11652: GDS-12/31/82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NPG PHASE II STUDY

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE US AGREED AT THE PHASE II MEETING IN JANUARY TO FORWARD TO THE UK RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "CONCLUSIONS" TO THE PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT WHICH THE UK IS DRAFTING. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION SUGGESTIONS FOR CONCLUSIONS" TO THE REPORT FOR USE BY THE WASHINGTON STAFF IN PREPARING THE US INPUT. END SUMMARY.

1. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM AGREED AT ITS JANUARY MEETING IN LONDON THAT THE US AND FRG SHOULD FORWARD TO THE UK ANY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE "CONCLUSIONS" SECTION OF THE PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT WHICH THE UK IS DRAFTING. WE LIST SOME INITIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR CONCLUSIONS IN PARA 2 BELOW FOR USE BY THE WASHINGTON STAFF. THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT FULLY DEVELOPED, BUT SIMPLY OFFER SOME KEY ELEMENTS ON WHICH THE UK COULD DRAW IN PREPARING ITS DRAFT. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO LIMIT US INPUT AT THIS TIME TO SUCH "KEY ELEMENTS." WE SHOULD DEFER DETAILED COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON CONCLUSIONS TO THE NEXT MEETING OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM ON 2-4 APRIL.

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2. KEY ELEMENTS:

A. A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF NATO'S STRATEGY

OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

B. THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS WELL AS OF THE INITIAL TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IS POLITICAL, I.E., TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. HOWEVER, EFFECTIVENESS IN MILITARY TERMS MAY BE THE CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF POLITICAL REACTION.

C. POLITICAL CONTROL MUST BE MAINTAINED THROUGH ALL LEVELS OF FOLLOW-ON USE AND MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN RAPIDLY EVOLVING CONFLICT SITUATIONS.

D. PHASE I STUDIES PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHT INTO ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THE ANALYSES USED IN PHASE I STUDIES WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE CONCLUSIONS THEY REACH DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND MUST BE USED WITH CAUTION.

E. NATO MUST HAVE THE REQUISITE NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, MEANS OF DELIVERY AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE CAPABILITY FOR DIRECT DEFENSE AND DELIBERATE ESCALATION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SINCE, DUE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TACTICAL SITUATION, NATO COULD FIND ITSELF IN A SITUATION IN WHICH ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD AGAINST A LARGE-SCALE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

F. "MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS" IS DEPENDENT NOT ONLY ON THE MILITARY EFFECTS ACHIEVED, BUT ALSO ON OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, E.G., IMPACT ON ENEMY'S WILL AND OBJECTIVES. MILITARY EFFECTS CAN BE ANALYZED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF PRECISION, BUT OTHER FACTORS DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO PRECISE ANALYSIS. PHASE I STUDIES INDICATE THAT IMPORTANT MILITARY BENEFITS
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CAN BE OBTAINED FROM VARIOUS FOLLOW-ON USE OPTIONS, PRIMARILY DEFINED IN TERMS OF VARYING LENGTHS OF TIME IN WHICH THE ENEMY'S ADVANCE CAN BE BROUGHT TO A HALT.

G. IT IS INHERENT IN THE NUCLEAR BALANCE, IN WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN BRING LARGE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BEAR IN A CONFLICT IN EUROPE, THAT THE WARSAW PACT CAN UPSET ANY CALCULATIONS OF MILITARY ADVANTAGE GAINED BY NATO'S FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE BY THE SCALE OF POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT RESPONSE. NATO MUST ALWAYS ANTICIPATE, THEREFORE, THAT FURTHER FOLLOW-ON USE MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

#. SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES PROVIDE THE WARSAW PACT

WITH A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO RESPOND TO FOLLOW-ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON A LESSER, EQUAL, OR GREATER SCALE THAN THAT EMPLOYED BY NATO. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND, HOWEVER, AND THEY MIGHT NOT RESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ALL. THE WARSAW PACT IS WELL AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION, AND THIS FACT ALONE WOULD JUSTIFY FROM ITS POINT OF VIEW THE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED AND LIMITED FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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I. THE PHASE I STUDIES INDICATE THAT RESERVES AND REINFORCEMENTS COULD HAVE A CRITICAL ROLE FOLLOWING AN EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE LEVEL AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BY EITHER SIDE WOULD DEPEND ON THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO BRING THESE FORCES TO BEAR IN THE CONFLICT.

J. CONVENTIONAL FORCES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER FOLLOW-ON USE. CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF NATO'S DEFENSE EVEN IN THE FOLLOW-ON USE PHASE, AND, AS SUCH, CANNOT BE SUBSTITUTED FOR BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

K. COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAN BE MINIMIZED BY ACCURATE TARGETING, OFFSET TARGETING TECHNIQUES, AND USE OF LOW YIELD WEAPONS. IN PHASE I STUDIES, THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF STRIKES AGAINST AIRFIELDS ON BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT TERRITORY, DUE PRIMARILY TO THE RELATIVELY HIGH YIELD OF THE WEAPONS USED, AND THE LOCATION OF MANY SUCH TARGETS IN HIGHLY POPULATED AREAS.

L. GENERALLY, NATO WOULD FIND ITSELF AT A RELATIVELY GREATER MILITARY DISADVANTAGE THE LONGER IT DELAYED FOLLOW-ON USE. THE POTENTIAL LEVEL OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE WOULD

ALSO TEND TO BE GREATER WITH DELAY.

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M. DELIBERATE DELAYS BETWEEN INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE, AND DURING FOLLOW-ON USE PHASES, MAY PROVIDE TIME FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR REINFORCING AND REGROUPING NATO FORCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH DELAYS COULD PROVIDE SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WARSAW PACT AND, IN OTHER RESPECTS, COULD POSSIBLY POSE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES FOR NATO.

N. SCALE OF USE BY NATO CAN VARY BY ALTERING THE NUMBER AND/OR YIELDS OF WARHEADS INVOLVED, OR BY CHANGING THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF USE. SCALE OF USE WOULD BE DETERMINED BY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN COMBINATION WITH OVER-ALL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. INTENSIFIED USE ON THE BATTLEFIELD WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS ESCALATORY THAN USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND, USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THE RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION MORE APPARENT TO THE ENEMY AND ACCORDINGLY MIGHT HAVE A MORE DISSUASIVE IMPACT. RUMSFELD

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